ACQUAINTANCE CONTENT AND OBVIATION
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Introduction A number of subjective expressions—e.g. predicates of personal taste (PPTs) (tasty), psych predicates (sounds) and subjective attitudes (find)—have been noted to give rise to what Ninan (2014) calls the Acquaintance Inference (AI) (see also Pearson 2013; Kennedy and Willer 2016). Asserting sentences in (1), the speaker is committed to having a relevant firsthand experience with the object in question: gustatory (1a), auditory (1b), or visual (1c). Explicit denials of that commitment yield infelicity. However, the AI may disappear in scope of certain obviators (Pearson 2013; Klecha 2014; Ninan 2014; also Tenny 2006). They convey indirectness of some sort (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2010 on must), and include the classes in (2) and, fittingly, grammatical markers of indirect evidentiality (3).

(1) a. The cake was delicious, #but I never tasted it. PPT
b. The piano sounded out of tune, #but I’ve never heard it. PSYCH PREDICATE
c. I consider the dress blue and black, #but I’ve never seen it. SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE

(2) The cake …………………. delicious, but I never tasted it.

a. ✓must/might have been EPISTEMIC MODAL AUXILIARIES
b. ✓obviously/certainly/apparently was PREDICATES OF CLARITY/EVIDENCE
c. ✓will/is going to be FUTURATE OPERATORS

(3) Ben durian-i dene-mely-im. { Lezzetliy-miş / #Lezzetli }. TURKISH EVIDENTIAL miş
I durian-ACC try-must-1SG tasty-IND.EV / tasty
‘I should try durian one day. { It is tasty, I hear/infer. / #It is tasty.’}

In this talk, we show that the cross-constructional variation in the patterns of AI obviation presents challenges for previous accounts of the AI (Pearson 2013; Ninan 2014). In place of these, we argue for the existence of two kinds of acquaintance content: (i) the AI of PPTs, which arises from an evidential restriction dependent on a parameter of interpretation that obviators update; and (ii) the AI of psych predicates, subjective attitudes and overt experiencer PPTs, which we argue is a classic presupposition.

Previous approaches: Ninan (2014) Ninan argues that the AI arises due to an epistemologically grounded norm of assertion. In order to know the truth of o is tasty, the speaker must have prior experience with o. Asserting unmarked propositions (as in 1a) typically assumes such knowledge. Marked (e.g. modalized) propositions, as in (2), are not subject to this convention and thus allow obviation. This approach correctly predicts auto-centric cases (where the taster is the speaker; Lasersohn 2005), but does not account for the exocentric ones. Exocentric readings also have an AI (4) that is subject to obviation (5). Ninan’s (2014) pragmatic approach rooted in the speaker’s knowledge does not predict it.

(4) Hobbes’s new food is tasty, #but no cat has ever tried it yet. EXOCENTRIC AI
(5) Hobbes’s new food { must be / obviously is / will be } tasty, ✓but no cat has ever tried it yet.

Previous approaches: Pearson (2013) Pearson argues that the AI is a presupposition:

(6) [tasty-to]c[td] = λx.λo: x has tried o in WORLD(i). 1 iff o is tasty to x in WORLD(i)

Pearson further argues that PPTs are Chierchia’s (1995) individual-level predicates licensed in the scope of a generic operator. The generic binds the taster argument x, and as its restrictor it has the quantificational domain restriction Dom. The AI projects, yielding a generic presupposition that every member of Dom has tried o. In this system, bare PPTs have an auto-centric AI when the speaker is in Dom. Obviation (the cases in (2)) is explained as follows. As per von Fintel and Gillies (2010), must is taken to signal the speaker’s indirect evidence for o’s tastiness. Therefore, the speaker is not in Dom, as indirect evidence excludes having tried o, and (2a) is felicitous. However (cf. Ninan 2014), by the same token the felicity of the continuations in (1) is incorrectly implied: because the speaker has indirect evidence, they should be not in Dom. Pearson’s (2013) account faces further problems. It predicts that the speaker, when not in Dom, is necessarily irrelevant and is not committing to a judgment on o if/when they do try it. The prediction is false. (7) shows that with must, the AI disappears.

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(7) Just look at it! The cake {is, must be} delicious, but I am going to find it disgusting.

Finally, by connecting the AI to genericity Pearson’s (2013) analysis predicts that dispositional generics (Flavio smiles) would be similar to PPTs. However, the obviation with them is more constrained (8):

(8) Even though your son hasn’t smiled yet, based on his age, he obviously {does / can}.

**A direct proposal** We take the acquaintance content of PPTs to comment on direct evidential grounds for a proposition and model the AI following the account of directness in (von Fintel and Gillies 2010). A kernel of propositions K encodes direct knowledge, and the proposition \( \bigcap K \) is the set worlds compatible with what is known directly and indirectly. We assume that kernels are provided via an interpretive coordinate (cf. Yalcin’s (2007) information state) and treat evaluation indices as minimally 4-tuples: \( \langle \text{world, time, kernel, judge} \rangle \). Our semantics for PPTs, where they only take one argument, is given in (9a). The presupposition is couched in terms of vF&G’s direct settlement (9b). Finally, we assume that evaluation of a proposition for truth conventionally sets the kernel to that of the auto- or exocentric judge’s directly experienced knowledge.

(9) a. \[ \text{tasty}^c(w,t,K,j) = \lambda o: K \text{ directly settles whether } o \text{ is tasty for } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t \underbrace{1 \text{ iff } o \text{ is tasty for } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t} \]

b. \( X \text{ directly settles whether } p \text{ iff } \exists q \in X \{ q \subseteq p \lor q \cap p = \emptyset \} \)

Our account predicts that bare affirmative and negated propositions alike trigger an AI by the judge, capturing the fact that both exocentric and autocentric construals have an AI. For obviation, we propose that modals and other markers of indirectness update the kernel (like attitudes for Yalcin (2007)): they eliminate the direct/indirect distinction by overwriting \( K \) with \( \{ \bigcap K \} \) (10a), which leads to a requirement that the relevant information state is decided on the prejacent (10b). (10c) provides vF&G’s semantics for must: it adds the at-issue content that the information state is one where the prejacent is true as well as a requirement that the kernel doesn’t directly settle the prejacent.

(10) a. \[ \text{must}^c(w,t,K,j) = \lambda p: K \text{ does not directly settle whether } p \text{ in } \bigcap K \subseteq p \]

**Covert and overt experiencers** One argument for treatments of PPTs where they take an individual argument (a.o. Stephenson 2007; Stojanovic 2007; Pearson 2013) is the possibility of ‘overt experiencers’ (to me / to Hobbes) in addition to ‘bare’ uses. However, obviation patterns of covert and overt experiencers are not aligned. Overt experiencers in (11a) override all of the obviators but might (likely counterfactual here), and thus pattern with psych predicates (11b) and subjective attitudes (11b).

(11) a. The cake {#must/#might have been, #probably/#possibly was, #obviously/#apparently was} delicious to {me, Epeceptus }, but {I, he } never tasted it. **OVERT EXPERIENCER PPT**

b. The cake {#must/#might have, #probably/#possibly, #obviously/#apparently} delighted {me, Epeceptus }, but {I, he } never tasted it. **PSYCH PREDICATE**

c. {I, Epeceptus} {#must/#might have, #probably/possibly, #obviously/#apparently} found the cake delicious, but {I, he } never tasted it. **SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE**

The lack of an AI for bare PPTs under classic holes like must is alone an argument against Pearson’s (2013) presuppositional analysis. However, overt experiencer PPTs pattern in line with that analysis, and so do other predicates with an acquaintance requirement for overt experiencers, such as psych predicates and subjective attitudes. In sum, this suggests that bare uses are not simply instances of covert experiencers, but rather are something else (Lasersohn 2005; MacFarlane 2014). Our approach captures these data by making overt experiencers sensitive not to the kernel coordinate but to the kernel of the overt experiencer itself (12). In this way overt and bare uses have fundamentally the same requirement, but with respect to grammatically different sources for their kernel element.

(12) \[ \text{tasty to } \alpha^c_i = \lambda o: \text{the kernel of } \alpha^c_i \text{ in } w \text{ at } t \text{ directly settles whether } o \text{ is tasty to } j \text{ in } w \text{ at } t \]
References


