

Introduction. Amount Relatives (ARs) differ from restrictive relative clauses in that they often have an interpretation where what is referred to is not a particular object denoted by the head of the relative clause, but an *amount* of such objects (Carlson 1977, Heim 1987).

- (1) a. We lost the battle because we didn't have [_{DP}the [_{NP}soldiers [_{CP}that the Imperial Army had]]].
 b. It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne they spilled that evening.

Both sentences in (1) are ambiguous: the restrictive (intersective) interpretation of (1a) states that the reason for losing the battle was that we lacked the *particular soldiers* that the Imperial Army had (a truism). This is the OBJECT reading. On the more salient AMOUNT reading, (1a) claims that what we lacked was the *amount of soldiers* that the Imperial Army had. Virtually all extant analyses of ARs like (1) agree on one thing: the CP denotes a set of degrees. This is usually implemented by covert movement of a degree operator and abstraction over a degree variable (Heim 1987, Grosu & Landman 1998, von Stechow 1999, Meier 2015, a.o.).

- (2) $[[CP_{(1a)}]] = [Op_d \lambda d . [\text{the Imperial Army had } t_d\text{-MANY soldiers}]]$

Proposal. This paper proposes a novel analysis for ARs. I suggest that the AMOUNT readings in (1) are a special case of KIND interpretations. Concretely, in (1) the individual property denoted by the CP contributes a way to determine the SUBKIND of the KIND-level object provided by the head of the relative clause. As an illustration take (1a). The head NP *soldier* provides the name of a KIND (Carlson 1980) that we can reference and attribute properties to when pluralized (Chierchia 1998). From here, two observations independent to ARs are important to the argument: First, it is generally possible to allude to specific SUBKINDS by further restricting a plural definite description either with a demonstrative or with a relative clause (cf. Zamparelli 1998).

- (3) a. {*The/Those} cows are widespread. b. The cows *(that we talked about) are widespread.

The sentences in (3) make reference to some arbitrary SUBKIND of cows that are recoverable from the context. This shows that there are no *a priori* restrictions about what counts as a SUBKIND, any arbitrary property \mathcal{P} realized by a particular set of cows might do. (E.g., in (3) we could partition the kind *cow* by the SUBKIND of cows that I like and that of those I do not like.) Keeping this parallelism, I suggest (4) as a paraphrase of (1a).

- (4) We lost the battle because we didn't have soldiers with property \mathcal{P} .

This paraphrase makes explicit the idea that the denotation of the CP in (1a)—as in (3b)—is utilized to inform about the relevant property \mathcal{P} that the OBJECT-level soldiers in the extension of the AR realize, thereby providing information about how to determine a partition of the KIND *soldier* into different SUBKINDS. Thus, (1a) attributes the defeat in the battle to the property \mathcal{P} that the soldiers of the Imperial Army had and crucially ours lacked. The second independent observation is that properties like *being d-many* can be used to establish partitions: pluralities of n objects instantiate the property *be of cardinality n*. Since cardinalities are non-monotone, they obey Carlson's condition of the disjointness of SUBKINDS (see discussion in Carlson 1980, p.212). The result is that amounts (cardinalities, volumes) should be taken into account when establishing what property \mathcal{P} in the context provides the right way to partition a KIND into SUBKINDS. **Prediction I: AMOUNT \subseteq KIND.**

It follows that AMOUNT readings are parasitic on KIND readings. Some arguments: **I.** All ARs allow KIND interpretations, by suitable adjustments of the contexts.

- (5) a. The Imperial Army has many more soldiers than us. $[[(1a)]]$ \rightsquigarrow AMOUNT
 b. The Imperial Army has less soldiers, but they are all elite/stronger/... $[[(1a)]]$ \rightsquigarrow KIND

II. McNally (2008) noted that AMOUNT readings of ARs resist modification by DP-level *only*. The same is true of KIND readings; this is exemplified by (6), which only has an OBJECT reading.

(6) It will take days to drink the only champagne they spilled that evening. [McNally 2008]

III. Semantically, the heads of ARs with both KIND and AMOUNT readings seem to behave like indefinites, despite the presence of the definite determiner (see Wilkinson 1995 on the noun “kind”): neither the AMOUNT nor the KIND readings of (1a) have real-world referents (that is, they lack the OBJECT reading), as shown by their compatibility with *for* adverbials.

(7) John drank the wine that we spilled at the party every day for a year. ↗ OBJECT

IV. Syntactically, both AMOUNT and KIND readings are incompatible with *which*, (8a), and they are restricted to the definite determiner, (8b).

(8) a. It will take us years to drink the champagne { \emptyset / that / *which} there was at the party.

b. It will take us years to eat {the / *some / *few} chocolates they ate at the party.

V. Embedded exclamatives provide another context where AMOUNT readings of relative clauses arise, and here too KIND readings are readily accessible: a sentence like *It's amazing the peppers she ate!* might express amazement at the amount or at the kind of peppers that she ate (Rett 2008 a.o.). VI. If KIND and AMOUNT readings of ARs are related in any way, we should expect similarities between the syntactic distribution and semantic properties of the nouns “kind” and “amount” as well. Scontras (2014) shows that this is indeed the case, and that they both differ from ordinary pseudo-partitives—e.g., “glass of water”—in crucial respects. **Prediction II: degree abstraction.** If ARs like (1) were degree constructions, i.e., if they involved either degree abstraction or some form of null gradable predicate, we would expect ARs in (1) to have a parallel distribution to constructions that are well-known to involve degree abstraction. There is some evidence against this. First, degree abstraction is subject to certain restrictions. For example, the ill-formedness of (9a)–(9c) is commonly attributed to the interaction between negation and a degree operator (Rullmann 1995 a.m.o.). However, ARs with an AMOUNT reading are felicitous in the same configuration, (9d).

(9) a. *How many soldiers doesn't the Imperial Army have?
b. *How many soldiers the Imperial Army doesn't have!
c. *We have more soldiers than the Imperial Army doesn't have.
d. We won the battle because we had the soldiers that the Imperial Army didn't have.

Second, constructions involving degree abstraction often allow sub-deletion, a hallmark of degree abstraction plus deletion processes (Kennedy 2002, Grosu & Landman *forthcoming*). ARs don't.

(10) a. I brought the amount of bananas that you brought of apples.

b. I brought as many bananas as you brought apples.

c. *I brought the bananas that you brought apples.

Third, in some cases with enough contextual support, AMOUNT interpretations are accessible even in the absence of a relative clause (e.g., replaced by a PP or dropped altogether), showing that we should not depend on the presence of a degree operator within the CP to get AMOUNT readings.

(11) We lost the battle because we didn't have the soldiers (of the Imperial Army).

Conclusion. The paper has consequences for the typology of relative clauses and for the status of ARs altogether: it recasts a subset of Carlson's (1977) ARs as run of the mill restrictive relative clauses with a KIND reading, which are shown to exist independent of ARs. If this paper and (some of) the conclusions in Herdan (2008) and McNally (2008) are correct, there might not be ARs in English. In the paper I also provide a compositional account of (SUB)KIND readings of ARs like (1) and discuss the consequences for our understanding of the relationship between kinds and degrees.